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53 Comp. Pol. Stud. 3 (2020)

handle is hein.journals/compls53 and id is 1 raw text is: 

Article


                                                    Comparative Political Studies
                                                         2020, Vol. 53(l) 3-39
                                                         @ The Author(s) 2019
                                                         Article reuse guidelines:
  Resource         Curse':                      sagepub.com/journals-permissions
                                                 DOl: 10.1s177/0010414019830727
Evidence         From       Cases of               journals.sagepub.com/home/cps

Oil-Related Bribery                                            OGE




Paasha Mahdavi'




Abstract
While  some   resource-rich  countries are  highly corrupt, others  have
transparent and  well-functioning governments. What   explains this wide
variation in so-called resource-cursed states? I show that these differences
result from domestic  institutional choices over how resource extraction
is governed. Some  governments  grant procurement  authority-the  ability
to award   contracts for production  rights-to  state-owned  enterprises,
whereas  others  place this authority in ministries. Building upon agency
theory, I argue that this choice matters: The relative political autonomy
of state-owned  enterprises compared  with  ministries fosters an opaque
regulatory environment  that incentivizes malfeasance. Using new data on
transnational bribes in 59 oil-producing countries, I show evidence for a
robust link between oil-related institutions and bribery, even after addressing
the endogeneity  of institutional choice via instrumental variables analysis.
This research has implications not only for the political economy of the
resource curse hypothesis but also for existing theories on corruption and
regulatory independence.


Keywords
resource   curse,   corruption,   state-owned   enterprises,  regulatory
independence


'University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA
Corresponding Author:
Paasha Mahdavi, Department of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara,
Ellison 3834, Mail Code: 9420, Santa Barbara, CA 93 106-9420, USA.
Email: paasha@ucsb.edu

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