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B-146896 1 (1972-05-08)

handle is hein.gao/gaobaaeiz0001 and id is 1 raw text is: 

                            UNC.LASSINFi


COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S                     NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT IN READINESS
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS                    OF STRATEGIC ARMY FORCES
                                          Department of the Army  B-146896

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                                                    11II11 H   111111111 I1111111111111111I

WHY THE REVIEW WAS MADE                                   LM091330
     This is the third in a series of reports by the General Accounting Office
     (GAO) on the readiness of key commands within the general-purpose forces.
     GAO reported to the Congress on October 6, 1969, on 7th Army units in
     Europe and on June 30, 1970, on the Navy's Atlantic and 6th Fleets. Both
     reports are classified Secret and bear the number B-146964.

     General-purpose forces are relied upon for military actions short of gen-
     eral nuclear war. They include most Army combat and combat-support forces,
     virtually all Navy units except the POLARIS fleet, all Marine Corps units,
     and tactical units of the Air Force. The Strategic Army Forces (STRAF),
     which are composed of 4-1/3 divisions, are to be constantly available to
     support national commitments. There is considerable congressional inter-
     est in the readiness of STRAF, and STRAF has been the subject of previous
     investigations by congressional committees.

     GAO reviewed selected units of three of the 4-1/3 divisions which are des-
     ignated as STRAF.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

     It would be difficult for STRAF units to deploy quickly at full strength
     because many units are not combat ready. A considerable amount of mainte-
     nance support would be required to bring the essential combat and combat-
     support equipment to a fully ready condition. In the units reviewed by
     GAO, more than one third of the essential combat and combat-support equip-
     ment was unable to perform its primary mission. (See p. 8.)
       --About 83 percent of the M-60 tanks available to units of two divisions
         had deficiencies which seriously impaired their ability to perform ef-
         fectively. (See p. 10.)
       --About 55 percent of the tracked vehicles inspected in another division
         were unable to perform their primary missions. (See p. 34.)    -
     Adequate supply support was not available at battalion and division levels
     for promptly repairing equipment. GAO found that:

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