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1 1 (September 9, 2024)

handle is hein.crs/goveqpc0001 and id is 1 raw text is: Libya and U.S. Policy Over a decade after a 2011 uprising and U.S.-backed military intervention that toppled longtime authoritarian leader Muammar al Qadhafi, Libya has yet to make a transition to stable governing arrangements. Elections and diplomacy have produced a series of interim governments, but militias, local leaders, and subnational coalitions backed by competing foreign patrons have remained the most powerful arbiters of public affairs. The postponement of planned elections since 2021, Libyans' continuing lack of consensus over electoral and constitutional arrangements, the potential fragility of a United Nations (UN)-backed ceasefire, and the reemergence of institutional rivalry are prolonging Libya's instability and pose challenges for U.S. decisionmakers. Successive U.S. Administrations have sought to prevent Libya from serving as a permissive environment for transnational terrorist groups and have taken different approaches to Libya's internal conflict and interventions by other countries. The Biden Administration has called for the holding of new elections and used U.S. influence to bolster UN-led mediation efforts to that end. The increased presence and influence in Libya of Russian officials and security actors since 2020 paired with the effects of ongoing conflict and political instability to Libya's south appear to be motivating the Biden Administration to prioritize efforts to unify Libyan institutions, despite lingering international and Libyan concerns about the behavior, legitimacy, and intentions of key actors. An enduring Russian military presence in Libya would create complications for U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military planners. Russia has also reportedly used Libya as a logistical hub for operations in the Sahel and Central African Republic. The 118th Congress has appropriated funds for U.S. diplomacy and aid programs, including pursuant to the Global Fragility Act (GFA, Title V of Division J, P.L. 116- 94). Congress also provided funds in 2024 to reestablish a U.S. full-time diplomatic presence in Libya, which could enable more robust U.S. engagement. War, Ceasefre, and a Deferred ection Libya's 2012 election produced governing arrangements that devolved into conflict in 2014, effectively dividing the country along ideological, geographic, and institutional lines. Conflict re-erupted in April 2019, when a coalition of eastern Libya-based armed groups led by Qadhafi-era military defector Khalifa Haftar known as the Libyan National Army (LNA, alt. Libyan Arab Armed Forces, LAAF), attempted to seize the capital, Tripoli, from the then-internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA). Russia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, and leaders of Libya's House of Representatives (HOR, an interim parliament last elected in 2014) backed the LNA. With Turkish military support, the GNA and anti- LNA western Libyan militias forced the LNA to withdraw. Updated September 9, 2024 Libya has remained divided since, with foreign forces still present, and opposing coalitions separated by a line of control west of Sirte (Figure 1). Multilateral diplomacy in 2020 helped achieve a ceasefire, which the UN monitors. In 2021, members of a UN-appointed Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) and the HOR approved an interim Presidential Council (PC) and Government of National Unity (GNU) to replace the GNA, with a mandate to serve until elections or through June 2022. The LPDF and HOR endorsed Abdul Hamid Dabaiba as GNU Prime Minister, along with a three-member Presidential Council. The UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) facilitated discussions among the GNU, the HOR, and the High Council of State (HCS, an advisory representative body), but was unable to establish a constitutional and legal basis for parliamentary and presidential elections then-planned for December 2021. The elections were postponed indefinitely and have yet to be rescheduled amid ongoing disputes over electoral laws and the possibility of a new interim government. Since that time, eastern Libya-based actors have revived efforts to have a rival government, led by Osama Hamad, recognized as legitimate. Competition among Libyans has intensified for control over the National Oil Corporation (NOC) and Central Bank, which govern the oil operations, revenues, and public sector payments on which most Libyans rely. Figure I. Libya: Areas of Influence Source: Prepared by CRS using ArcGIS and media reporting. A Scrarnble for Libya and U.S. Policy In April 2024, Special Representative of the UN Secretary- General (SRSG) for Libya Abdoulaye Bathily of Senegal resigned, citing the unwillingness of the GNU, HOR, HCS,

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