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Informing the legislitive debate since 1914

Updated January 25, 2023
The SEC's Proxy Advisory Firm Disclosure Reforms

The boards of directors of public companies provide
strategic planning and oversight. The boards, in turn
respond to the views of shareholders and may vote on
proposed corporate changes if the proposals gain a majority
of affirmative shareholder votes at annual and special
shareholder meetings. Proposals may include issues
involving prospective mergers, executive compensation,
environmental policy, corporate diversity, political
contributions, and executive management. Due to the large
number and diverse array of issues in such proposals, proxy
advisory firms have emerged to provide proposal voting
recommendations to institutional investors, who are large
shareholders in most public companies.
In July 2020, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) adopted controversial amendments to its proxy rules
implemented pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (1934 Act; P.L. 73-291) that require proxy advisory
firms to disclose more information about themselves,
including potential conflicts of interests. In July 2022, the
SEC reversed key parts of the 2020 rulemaking.
The Proxy Advisory industry
State-based business incorporation laws give the states
substantial authority over companies that are incorporated
within a given state, including various aspects of
shareholder voting. Under such laws, at annual and special
shareholder meetings, shareholders have the right to vote
their shares to elect directors, approve or reject a company's
generally binding management proposals, and submit and
vote on generally non-binding shareholder proposals.
Within the parameters of the state incorporation laws, under
Rule 14a-8 of the 1934 Act, the SEC oversees the types of
information shareholder proposals contain, who is eligible
to submit proposals for a vote, and how that information is
disseminated to voters via a proxy statement. The proxy
statement is an SEC-required document containing
information that companies provide to shareholders to
enable them to make informed decisions about proposals
being considered at shareholder meetings.
Approximately 70% of the outstanding shares in publicly
owned domestic corporations are owned by institutional
investors such as mutual funds, index funds, pension funds,
and hedge funds. Institutional investors' individual
portfolios may contain the securities of hundreds of
different public companies. As a consequence, for many of
them, understanding the issues associated with multiple
public company board member elections and thousands of
shareholder proposals at corporate shareholder meetings
can be both complicated and costly. Many medium and
smaller-sized institutional investors often lack the necessary
size to cost-effectively conduct such research and outsource

such work to advisory firms. While they tend to conduct in-
house research, some larger investors such as BlackRock
also supplement their research through the use of advisory
firms.
The advisory business is dominated by two firms, Glass
Lewis and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), jointly
estimated to have about 97% of the advisory market share.
In 2004, two SEC no-action letters indicated that
institutional investment managers could show that their
proxies voted in the best interest of their clients through the
use of voting policies formulated by independent third
parties, such as proxy advisory firms. The development is
widely credited with helping to institutionalize demand
for the advisory firms' services.
Views on the Advsory Ffrms
Through the years, various academics and business
interests-including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the
American Council for Capital Formation, the Society for
Corporate Governance, the Business Roundtable, the
NASDAQ Stock Exchange, and the National Association of
Manufacturers (NAM)-have argued that, among other
things, advisory firms require additional regulation because:
 There tends to be an overreliance on them, said to be
problematic because it diminishes the likelihood that
investors will engage with portfolio firms. An extreme
reliance is found in something called robo-voting
wherein investor clients vote immediately after
receiving advisory firm recommendations. A potential
downside of this is that it leaves portfolio firms with
little opportunity to assess the advice and respond.
 Their voting recommendations can push a social and
political agenda that some contend have little connection
to shareholder value. Chief among them are the
pervasive so-called environmental, social, and political
proposals whose contributions to shareholder value is a
debate that has garnered mixed research findings.
 They have potential conflicts of interests that may bias
their recommendations and are not adequately disclosed.
For example, an ISS subsidiary earns fees from public
companies for advising them on corporate governance
and compensation policies.
 Their research protocols are not transparent, and the
research may be subject to problematic omissions and
methods and analytical flaws. These are said to be
reinforced by the allegedly non-competitive nature of
the industry's essentially duopolistic structure.

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