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The Modes of Constitutional Analysis:
Structuralism (Part 7)
January 13, 2022
This Legal Sidebar Post is the seventh in a nine-part series that discusses certain methods or modes of
analysis that the Supreme Court has employed to determine the meaning of a provision within the
Constitution. (For additional background on this topic and citations to relevant sources, please see CRS
Report R45 129, Modes of Constitutional Interpretation.)
One of the most common modes of constitutional interpretation is based on the Constitution's structure.
Drawing inferences from the Constitution's design gives rise to some of the most important relationships
the Constitution establishes-the relationships among the three branches of the federal government
(commonly called separation ofpowers or checks and balances); the relationship between the federal and
state governments (known as federalism); and the relationship between the government and the people.
Two basic approaches seek to make sense of these relationships.
The first, known as formalism, posits that the Constitution sets forth all the ways in which federal power
may be shared, allocated, or distributed. This approach focuses on the structural divisions in the
Constitution with the idea that close adherence to these rules is required to achieve the preservation of
liberty. An example of the use of this form of structuralism as a mode of interpretation is found in
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha. In that case, the Court held that one house of
Congress could not by resolution unilaterally curtail the executive branch's statutory authority to allow a
deportable alien to remain in the United States. The Court examined the Constitution's structure and
noted that, under the Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses in Article I, Sections 1 and 7, laws with
subject matter that is legislative in character or effect require passage by a majority in both houses and
presentment to the President for his signature or veto. The Court wrote: It emerges clearly that the
prescription for legislative action in [Article I, Sections 1 and 7 of the Constitution] represents the
Framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a
single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure. Viewing the exercise of the one-house
veto in Chadha to be of a legislative nature, the Court concluded that the structural relationships the
Constitution established between the legislative and executive branches forbid the one-House legislative
veto. As demonstrated in Chadha, a formalist approach to separation-of-powers questions rejects not
only looking to post-ratification historical practices as a guide for determining constitutional meaning, but
also eschews balancing tests that weigh the degree of interference with one branch's powers.
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
LSB10685
CRS Legal Sidebar
Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress](ViewImageLocal?handle=hein.crs/govefcu0001&div=1&collection=&method=preview&ext=.png&size=3)
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