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1 1 (July 6, 2021)

handle is hein.crs/govedxt0001 and id is 1 raw text is: ressiottal Raseavh $ervnze Ln& rrrdri~j th*. I 4d d~v #bA~ rge 1)14 9 July 6, 2021 An Introduction to Oversight of Offices of Inspector General Who watches the watchers? is a questionthat is frequently posed whenpeople consider therole of oversight bodies, including offices ofinspector general (OIGs). However, the organizationof OIGs may pose unique challenges that make it more difficult to conduct oversight of their activities. In particular, the level of independence from agency leaders that allows inspectors general (IGs) to conduct their audits andinvestigations with les s riskof actual or perceived interference also makes it more difficult to identify and remedy is sues that aris e within an OIG by limiting their supervision by senior agency officials. While oversightofOIGs may create specific challenges for Congress and other stakeholders, the efficient and effective operationofOIGs, like the agencies and officials they oversee, is important to the successfuloperation of the government. Congress has grappledwith the organizationalchallengeof IG oversight through the Inspector General Act (IGAct) of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.). While Section 3(a) of the act states that each IGshallreport to and be under the general supervision ofthe establishment' in which they serve, it also states that agency leadership may not prevent or prohibit the Inspector General from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation. In practice, these provisions mean thatOIGs typically operatewith less supervision fromagency leaders than otherofficials do. While the overall focus of the IGAct is oriented toward independence for IGs, particularly fromthos e officials who they oversee, it does contain severaldis crete provisions, which are discussed throughout this In Focus, that facilitate or require specific forms of oversight of OIGs. This In Focus details how the IGAct addresses oversight of OIGs and provides information on government organizations thathave formal and informal oversight roles with regard to the IG community,including the IG community itself, other oversight offices, thePresident, agency leaders, and Congress. The Inspector General Community A consistentformofoversight ofOIGs comes fromthe inspector general community itself. The Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) is composed ofinspectors general and certainother oversight officials who are tasked with, among other things, increasingthe professionalismand effectiveness ofOIGs. CIGIE conducts oversight of particular OIG through two principle mechanisms: its Integrity Committee and OIG peer reviews. The Integrity Committee is a body within CIGIE created under Section 11(d) ofthe IG Act and tasked with receiving and reviewing allegations of wrongdoing against IGs and OIG staff. Investigativereports of the Integrity Committee are provided to both the appropriate congressional committees and the President (or agency head if that official appoints the agency's IG). The IG community also conducts regular peer reviews in which OIGs evaluate each other's procedures and recent work to determine compliance with government audit, investigation, andinspection standards. These reviews provide regular opportunities for OIGs to receive expert evaluations of their activities. Other Oversight Offices In addition to reviews within the IGcommunity, other federal entities may also oversee OIGs in some circumstances. The GovernmentAccountability Office (GAO), in particular, has the authority to investigate the operations of OIGs and to improve their effectiveness and compliance with laws, regulations, and best practices for audits and investigations. For instance, in April2021, GAO published a preliminary report on its review of the Department of Homeland Security OIG at the request of the House Committee on Homeland Security and appeared at a hearing on the subjectbefore the committee (GAO-21- 452T). Under Section 4(b) of the IG Act, OIGs are also required to comply with GAO auditing standards. GAO may conduct compliance reviews to ensure that each OIGis adhering to those standards andmake recommendations related to the operations of OIGs. In addition, officials within OIGs may be subjectto the jurisdiction of the Office of Government Ethics and the Office of Special Counsel in some circumstances. Potential violations of federal criminal law may be reviewed by the Dep artment of Justice. The President One ofCongress's principal design decisions in the creation of OIGs has beento provide a relatively high degree of independence fromthe President and agency leaders. When Presidents havebeen perceived to act against that expectation of independence, even when they are acting in a manner allowed under the IG Act, they have typically been met with bipartisan criticismin Congress. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11546, Removal of Inspectors General: Rules, Practice, and Considerations for Congress, by Ben Wilhelm. https ://crs rept

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