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1 1 (August 20, 2020)

handle is hein.crs/govdblz0001 and id is 1 raw text is: August20,2020 Russian Armed Forces: Military Doctrine and Strategy Members ofCongress may have an interest in the evolution and current state ofRussianmilitary doctrine and strategy to assess Russian intentions and capabilities. Russia has expanded its military capabilities over the last decade, which has beendisplayedin its invasionof Ukraine and intervention in Syria. Enhanced military capabilities have enabled the Russian govemment to expand its policy options andpursue more aggressive foreign policy decisions. These changes pair with recent statements and adjustments to Russian nilitary doctrine that provide insight into how Rus sian leaders think aboutusing forceto advance foreign policy objectives. Rumssian MIlitary a nd Security Strategy Documen ,ts Rus sia's official securitydoctrines are detailed in its 2014 Military Doctrine and 2015 National Security Strategy. Other key strategy documents include the 2016 Foreign Policy Concept, 2017 Naval Strategy, and 2020 Principles of Nuclear Deterrence Strategy. These documents offer insight into how Rus sian leaders perceive threats and how Russian military and security policymakers envision the future of conflict. In addition, the Military Doctrine and the National Security Strategy identify the importanceof information and the danger of internal, as well as external, threats. The 2014 Military Doctrine divides the perceivednature of threats to Russia into two categories: military risks and military threats. Military risks are ales ser designation, defined as situations that could leadto a military threat under certain conditions. A military threat is characterized by a real pos sibility ofan outbreakof a military conflict. Once fighting breaks out, Russian military theory and doctrine identify atypologyofconflicts relating to the extent and type of conflict, gradually increasingin intensity: armed conflict, local war, regional war, large-scale war, and global (nuclear) war. These levels of conflict are important for understanding how the Russian military envisions the scale, nature, actors, and levels of escalation in war. Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolay Patrushev stated in July 2019 that Russia would updateits National Security Strategy in 2020. Although anew version has not yet appeared, most analysts expect its publication in the near future. New G eeration WarEare In a 2013 speech, and in a subsequent article in the Rus sian- language newspaper Military-Industrial Courier, Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov described Russia's conception ofthe nature of warin the modem era, defining it by the use of nonmilitary tools and politically led conflict. Subsequent Russian actions in Ukraine strongly reflected this view, as they were characterized by the extensive use ofnon-state armed actors, information and disinformation operations, and other non-kinetic strategies. The very 'rules of war' have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness. General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Gerasimov des cribedthe Rus sian military's awareness of the complex and interconnected nature of modem warfare, increasingly defined by amix ofnon-kinetic tactics and conventional military force. Gerasimov's descriptionwas the culmination of various debates in the Russian military about what it perceives as the changing nature of war, or what it calls new generation warfare (NGW). NGW describes a holistic approach to modem war that encompasses a range ofpolitical, military, information, and economic tools across situations and locations. It presumes conflictwill often be preceded bypsychological and informational contests to weaken an adversary's morale and capability to sustain conflict. NGW does not lower the importance ofnmilitary power; instead, it recognizes the added importance ofnon -kinetic and asymmetric tools. Gerasimov's conception derived froma beliefthat Western countries were already using political strategies against adversaries, including supporting democracy movements to undermine or overthrow regimes. The Russian military and security leadership viewed the so-called color revolutions, democratic protests in Ukraine, and overthrow of Muamnur al Qadhafiin Libya as examples ofthis Western strategy. Use of Force Rus sia's military strategy identifies the use ofkinetic force as only one component in support of widerpolitical or diplomatic objectives. Rather than seeking to dominate a battlespace, Russia prioritizes flexibility and the ability to adapt to changing conditions in a conflict. This can result in the injection of conventional forces, a reliance on irregular and non-state actors,orboth, dependingon circumstances and situations. During Russia's invasion of eastern Ukraine, for example, Russiarelied on irregular and non-state actors backed by the limited injection ofRussiantroops to defeat Ukrainian forces. Rus sia's preference for the measureduseofforce, however, does not imply atrade-offbetween the decisiveuse of military power and escalation management. Ru s sian k \g

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