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1 1 (June 30, 2020)

handle is hein.crs/govdare0001 and id is 1 raw text is: FF.ri E~$~ & Updated June 30, 2020 Election Security: States' Spending of FY2018 and FY2020 HAVA Payments State and local systems have been targeted as part of efforts to interfere with U.S. elections, and Congress has responded in part with funding. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141) provided $380 million for payments to the 50 states, the District of Columbia (DC), American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands authorized under the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA; 52 U.S.C. §§20901-21145), and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-93) included $425 million for HAVA payments to those jurisdictions and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. This In Focus offers an overview of spending of the FY2018 and FY2020 HAVA payments to date. It starts by summarizing how funding recipients initially proposed using the funds, how the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic has affected some of those plans, and how much of the funding recipients have reported spending to date. It then introduces some issues related to the availability of funds and the timing of spending and reporting. Information about spending of the FY2018 and FY2020 HAVA payments may be relevant both to Members who are interested in oversight of the FY2018 and FY2020 funds and to Members who are considering further funding for similar purposes. It might help inform decisions about whether to provide additional funding, for example, and, if so, whether or how to specify conditions for its use. Funding for the FY2018 and FY2020 payments was appropriated under provisions of HAVA that authorized a program to provide payments for general improvements to the administration of federal elections (52 U.S.C. §§20901, 20903-20904). The explanatory statements accompanying the FY2018 and FY2020 spending bills highlighted five specific election security-related uses to which recipients may apply the funds: * replacing paperless voting systems; * implementing post-election audits; * updating election-related computer systems to address cyber vulnerabilities; * providing election officials with cybersecurity training; and * instituting election cybersecurity best practices. Funding recipients were asked to submit plans for use of the payments to the agency charged with administering the funds, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC). Much of the planned spending they reported in those initial submissions was on the specific election security measures highlighted by the FY2018 and FY2020 explanatory statements. Some of the proposed spending included transitioning to voting systems that produce a voter- verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT), for example, or researching or conducting post-election audits. Many of the spending plans also included training-related spending, such as hiring election security trainers or running tabletop exercises that simulate real-world security incidents, or spending on cybersecurity upgrades or best practices, such as conducting penetration tests of state election systems or acquiring tools to protect those systems against distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) or ransomware attacks. Other spending proposals included plans to fund other types of election security measures, such as improvements to the physical security of election board facilities or grants to county election officials to address physical vulnerabilities. Some states also proposed spending on activities that may not be focused specifically on securing elections, such as conducting general voter outreach, improving polling place accessibility, or implementing automatic or online voter registration policies. Some states have adjusted or considered adjusting their spending plans in response to COVID-19. The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic introduced challenges for the administration of elections in the 2020 election cycle, such as higher demand for mail voting and increased difficulty recruiting poll workers for in-person voting. Efforts to address such challenges can come with additional costs. Election officials may have to purchase new equipment to process the increased volume of mail ballots, for example, or upgrade their databases to enable voters to request ballots online, hire more temporary workers to process mail ballots and ballot requests, buy cleaning supplies and protective equipment for polling places, or offer additional poll worker training and voter education. Congress provided $400 million specifically for COVID- 19-related election expenses in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act (P.L. 116-136), but the FY2018 and FY2020 HAVA payments can also be applied to some of the new costs. According to guidance from the EAC, the FY2018 and FY2020 HAVA funds as well as some other funds previously appropriated under HAVA can be used to cover certain elections expenses incurred as a result of the pandemic. Official data on updates to initial spending plans or the specifics of how funds have been spent since the pandemic began do not appear to be publicly available at this time, so K~:> p\w -- , gn'a', goo mppm qq\ , q I 'S 11LULANJILiN,

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