![handle is hein.cow/anamacp0362 and id is 1 raw text is: INTRODUCTION
The 1960's are witnessing diplomatic
changes as profound and as far-reaching
as any experienced in modern history.
In a sense, said an American official
in 1964,
the tide of the cold war has definitely
turned. There is an unmistakable move-
ment away from a bipolar confrontation
of the two super-powers toward a more
diversified world. We are moving from
a period of dangerously abnormal sim-
plicity into a period of more relatively
normal diversity.'
The signs of such diplomatic diversity
are unmistakable and intriguing in their
implications. In the midst of the Do-
minican crisis, General de Gaulle once
again dramatically asserted his inde-
pendence of the United States. Toast-
ing a distinguished visitor, President
Charles Helou of Lebanon, de Gaulle
stressed that both nations were linked
by rejection of the modern imperalisms
that, invoking as always contrary ideolo-
gies, menace our universe. Concur-
rently, France's virtual secession from
the American-sponsored Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance
system-coupled with its highly critical
evaluation of Washington's intervention
in the affairs of the Dominican Repub-
lic-testified eloquently to the existence
of centrifugal forces impairing the unity
of the Western bloc.2 Meanwhile, other
1 Thomas L. Hughes, Making the World
Safe for Diversity, Department of State Bul-
letin, Vol. LI (July 6, 1964), p. 7.
2 See The New York Times, May 7, 1965.
That neutralist sources regarded Gaullism as a
kindred movement is indicated by the reaction
of the North African publication, Jeune Afrique,
which accepted the Gaullist premise that the
era of American and Soviet supremacy has
gone by; soon, this publication believed,
nations identified diplomatically with the
West-notably Spain, Greece, Turkey,
certain Latin-American countries, and
Pakistan-tended to follow the French
example. A case in point is Pakistan,
which in recent months has condemned
Western arms-aid to India, arrived at a
border detente with Communist China,
vocally criticized American involvement
in Southeast Asia, and joined de Gaulle
in advocating a more independent na-
tional role in regional and global affairs.
Behind the Iron Curtain, tendencies
toward polycentricity are equally un-
mistakable and significant. The post-
Stalin era in the Soviet Union has wit-
nessed a new official concern for internal
affairs and the solution of long-neglected
domestic problems generating public un-
rest. A number of European satellite
nations-particularly Poland, Rumania,
and Albania-espouse viewpoints and
policies differing from those advocated
in the Kremlin. But it has been the
acrimonious, seemingly intractable Sino-
Soviet dispute which has produced the
deepest fissures in the edifice of inter-
national communism. By mid-1965, of-
ficial Russian and Chinese attitudes had
become so antithetical that Mao Tse-
tung's government could openly accuse
Moscow of being aligned with Wash-
ington to subvert Marxist goals. Col-
laboration between the Soviet Union
and the United States to dominate the
world, an official Chinese source sol-
emnly warned, did not work in the
there will no longer be just two great powers.
There are no longer even two camps. . . . The
North Atlantic Treaty is dying, if it is not
already dead; so is the Warsaw Pact [i.e., the
Soviet Union's counterpart to NATO]. See
the text of the editorial in Atlas, Vol. 7 (June
1964), p. 328.
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