Dillon's Rule: The Case for Reform
![handle is hein.journals/valr68 and id is 703 raw text is: DILLON'S RULE: THE CASE FOR REFORM
Virginia has traditionally limited the power of its municipal govern-
ments to express grants of statutory authority. Dillon's Rule, a nineteenth
century judicial doctrine, mandates this strict construction of municipal
authority and has perpetuated this limited view of local power in Vir-
ginia. Although Dillon's Rule may reflect nineteenth century governmen-
tal relationships, the increased expectations and expanded role of modern
local government suggest that the rule inappropriately restricts local au-
thority. Moreover, the Supreme Court of Virginia's conclusory and some-
times inconsistent application of the doctrine illustrates its ineffective-
ness as a tool to regulate the relationships of modern government.
This note first traces the ideological origins of Dillon's Rule. It then
explores the Supreme Court of Virginia's inconsistent use of the rule and
discusses the merits of the rule in light of the structure and function of
contemporary local government. Finally, the note recommends that Vir-
ginia repeal Dillon's Rule to encourage more efficient and effective local
government.
I. TH ORIGINS OF THE RULE
Historically, the Supreme Court of Virginia has held that municipali-
ties may act only under expressly delegated powers and that their con-
duct is subject to legislative and judicial oversight.1 Dillon's Rule articu-
lates and perpetuates this narrow view of municipal power. Judge Dillon,
former Chief Justice of the Iowa Supreme Court and author of the first
important treatise on the law of municipal corporations,' articulated the
rule as follows:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal
corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and
no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those nec-
See, e.g., Burch v. Hardwicke, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 24, 32 (1878). One early twentieth-
century court described the supremacy of the state over local government as follows:
[Municipal corporations] are creatures of the State, which may grant or withhold
such powers as to it shall seem meet. The State may grant these powers in whole or
in part, conditionally or unconditionally, and may, at its pleasure, modify or with-
draw them, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest.
It may, if it chooses, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. The charter is
not a contract between the State and the municipality.
Richmond, F. & P. R.R. v. City of Richmond, 145 Va. 225, 238, 133 S.E. 800, 804 (1926).
2 Judge Dillon also served as a distinguished federal judge, President of the A.B.A., and a
leading corporate lawyer. See Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1059,
1109 n.210 (1980).
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Dillon's Rule: The Case for Reform
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