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34 J. Legal Education 714 (1984)
Understanding Law As Metaphor

handle is hein.journals/jled34 and id is 726 raw text is: Understanding Law as Metaphor James E. Murray Q. As I now understand your argument, you are saying that law is a process that produces devices called precedents that communicate interpersonally but cannot be reduced to objectively verifiable doctrinal formulae. You further argue that precedents can be defined as constituting moral injunctions persuasive because of the factual descriptions from which they are derived. If I understand you correctly, you have the burden of explaining to me what makes those descriptions and those injunctions compelling. A. I submit that the answer to your question is that a judicial opinion works the way a metaphor works. Jan G. Deutsch' One hallmark of Western civilization has been our respect and emphasis upon rational, logical thought. The scientific method is such a process; it is methodical, systematic, and effective. It is a system (all rational thought) that has allowed the sophisticated development of our way of life. No one would question its importance or efficacy. Law is much the same way. We view it as a developmental system of logic building on precedent to new levels, expanding to new theoretical heights. It becomes more sophisticated with society. Its operation is predictable, by and large, as built upon logical development. But is that all? Is law purely logical, and, if and when we disagree with the judge's opinion, illogical? Could there be something more, some intermediate stage of thinking which also characterizes the legal opinion? This article proposes that there is such a stage, and further that this stage may prove to be the basis of all human thought and particularly logical-rational thought. The intermediate stage discussed is analogical, metaphorical thinking which an increasing number of legal scholars are proposing as foundational to law. The two discussed here are G. Joseph Vining and James B. White. James E. Murray, B.A., 1977, Duquesne University; M.S.Ed., 1979, Duquesne University; J.D., 1984, Duquesne University. Mr. Murray has also studied at the American Academy in Rome and the American School for Classical Studies in Athens under a Fulbright Scholarship in classics. He is a member of the Pennsylvania Bar. -The author wishes to acknowledge the faculty of Duquesne University School of Law for their collective and individual excellence. Parts of this article were written for coursework in Administrative Law and Federal Courts taught by Professors John L. Gedid and Bruce S. Ledewitz, respectively. Thanks for comments and suggestions must be extended to Professors Gedid and Ledewitz, and also to Robert D. Taylor, Professor of Law, Duquesne University. Most especial thanks are given to Edward L. Murray, C.S.Sp., Ph.D., Professor of Psychology, Duquesne University, for his seminal thinking on the topic of metaphor and Heideggerian scholarship. Then lastly, PARENTIBUS MEIS-PIUS FILIUS. 1. Jan G. Deutsch, Law as Metaphor: A Structural Analysis of Legal Process, 66 Geo. L.J. 1339, 1346 (1978). 0 1984 by the Association of American Law Schools. Cite as 34 J. Legal Educ. 714 (1984).

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