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70 Fed. Probation 15 (2006)
Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgments in Criminal Justice Decisions: Should One Replace the other

handle is hein.journals/fedpro70 and id is 103 raw text is: September 2006                                                                         15
inn Cim~nl Jutc Decisions:
Stephen D. Gottfredson
Laura . Moriarty
Virginia Commonwealth University

IN VIRTUALLY ALL decision-making situ-
ations that have been studied, actuarially
developed devices outperform human judg-
ments. This is true with respect to psychiat-
ric judgments (see, for example, Meehl, 1965;
Gough, 1962; Ennis and Litwack, 1974);
graduate school admissions (e.g., Dawes,
1979; Dawes and Corrigan, 1974); prognostic
judgments made by sociologists and psychia-
trists relative to a parole-violation criterion
(Glaser, 1955, 1962); parole board decisions
(Gottfredson, 1961; Gottfredson and Bev-
erly, 1962; Carroll, Wiener, Coates, Galegher,
& Alibrio, 1982); mental health and cor-
rectional case worker judgments of offender
risk (Holland, Holt, Levi, & Beckett, 1983),
spousal assault (Hilton and Harris, 2005)
and in other areas (Goldberg, 1970), includ-
ing the analysis of credit risk (Somerville
and Taffler, 1995). Indeed, a recent review
and meta-analysis of 56 years' accumulation
of research on the clinical vs. statistical
prediction problem conducted as part of
a Festschrift for Paul E. Meehl, a pioneer
in the field, again confirms that statistical
models outperform clinical decision-makers
(IEgisd6ttier, White, Spengler, Maugherman,
Anderson, Cook, Nichols, Lampropoulos,
Walker, Cohen and Rush, 2006).
The relative superiority of statistical to
intuitive methods of prediction is due to
many factors. For example, human deci-
sion-makers often do not use information
reliably (e.g., Ennis and Litwack, 1974), they
often do not attend to base rates (Meehl
and Rosen, 1955), and this has been specifi-
cally illustrated in criminal justice decision-
making (Carroll, 1977); they may inappro-
priately weight items of information that

are predictive, or they may assign weight
to items that in fact are not predictive; and
they may be overly influenced by causal
attributions (e.g., Carroll, 1978) or spurious
correlations (Monahan, 1981). In fairness,
it should be pointed out that there may be
advantages to intuitive judgments as well.
For example, human decision-makers can
make use of information that cannot be made
available to a statistical device (at least read-
ily). Demeanor during an interview may be
one such example. Other factors in favor of
intuitive judgments are reviewed in Dawes
(1975; Dawes, Faust, and Meehl, 1989).'
Given these facts, is there reason to still
consider clinical judgments when determin-
ing risk-assessment within a justice system
population? Indeed, with the 1998 publica-
tion of Violent Offenders: Appraising and
Managing Risk (Quinsey, Harris, Rice and
Cormier), we find an argument that we
should not. What we are advising is not the
addition of actuarial methods to existing
practice, but rather the complete replacement
of existing practice with actuarial methods
(p. 171; see Litwack, 2001 for a strong rebuttal
in the arena of the assessment of dangerous-
ness). We argue that even though statistical
prediction is superior to clinical judgment in
almost all settings, this does not obviate the
need for nor value of clinical judgment in a
variety of arenas, including some criminal
justice venues. We use the roles of probation
officers and correctional treatment special-
ists to provide examples.
' Portions of the preceding discussion adapted
from Gottfredson and Gottfredson (1986).

Probation Officers and
Correctional Treatment
Specialists
Among the largest group of criminal justice
professionals is that working in corrections.
And with the vast number of adults and
juveniles on probation, parole or incarcer-
ated, the workload of these individuals is
quite high.
According to the U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, there are
about 90,600 probation officers and cor-
rectional treatment specialists nationally
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2006), and in
the federal system, there are approximately
5,000 officers throughout the United States
and its territories (personal communica-
tion, Richard Gayler, May 31, 2006). The
number of adults on probation in 2004 was
about 4.1 million (Glaze and Palla, 2005),
for an average caseload nationally of about
46. The top three states in terms of employ-
ment of probation officers and correctional
treatment specialists are California (13,090),
Texas (6,100) and Florida (5,760). When
examining data from 2004 that reports the
state's community corrections population,
we find that Texas has the largest, with
428,773 adults under supervision, followed
by California with 384,852, and Florida with
281,170 (Glaze and Palla, 2005). Using these
figures, the average caseloads range from a
high of 70 to a low of 29.
Qualifications for employment as a pro-
bation officer or correctional treatment spe-
cialist vary by state, but a Bachelor's degree
in social work, criminal justice or some other
related field typically is required (Bureau of

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