Duckworth v. Eagan: A Semantical Debate or the Continuing Debasement of Miranda
![handle is hein.journals/cathu39 and id is 1279 raw text is: NOTE
DUCKWORTH v. EAGAN: A SEMANTICAL
DEBATE OR THE CONTINUING
DEBASEMENT OF MIRANDA?
The United States Constitution affords a criminal defendant the opportu-
nity to be represented by counsel under certain circumstances. In particular,
the sixth amendment provides a defendant the right to counsel in criminal
prosecutions.1 Additionally, the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amend-
ment provides that [n]o person... shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself.2 While this clause does not directly guaran-
tee a criminal defendant the right to counsel, the United States Supreme
Court interprets the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment to af-
ford an accused a limited right to counsel prior to and during police
interrogation.3
In Miranda v. Arizona,4 the United States Supreme Court held that, prior
to questioning, the police must warn an accused of the right to remain silent
and the right to consult with an attorney prior to and during interrogation,
and that, absent a voluntary and knowing waiver of those rights, any state-
ment made by the accused cannot be used by the prosecution.' While prof-
fering a standard set of warnings to be used by law enforcement officers
during custodial interrogation,6 the Miranda Court indicated that a fully
effective equivalent7 of the enunciated warnings would satisfy fifth amend-
ment requirements. Since Miranda, courts have been receptive to warnings
that deviate from the explicit language of Miranda, but are in disagreement
1. In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to... have the Assist-
ance of Counsel for his defence. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see infra notes 62-72 and accompa-
nying text.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. [When an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by
the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-
incrimination is jeopardized. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. Id. at 479.
6. See infra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
7. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476. The Court stated that [t]he warnings required... are, in
the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissability of any statement
made by a defendant. Id. (emphasis added).
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Duckworth v. Eagan: A Semantical Debate or the Continuing Debasement of Miranda
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