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83 Va. L. Rev. 349 (1997)
Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence

handle is hein.journals/valr83 and id is 367 raw text is: SOCIAL INFLUENCE, SOCIAL MEANING, AND DETERRENCE Dan M. Kahan* INTRODUCTION W HY do individuals commit crimes? What policies should a community adopt to discourage criminality? The economic conception of deterrence bases its answers on the assumption that individuals behave rationally to maxi- mize their utility. Individuals commit crimes, this account pre- dicts, when the expected utility of law-breaking exceeds the ex- pected disutility of punishment. To promote obedience, the community should adopt the most cost-effective policies for raising the price of crime.' This model yields prescriptions on a diverse range of subjects-from the optimal tradeoff between probability of conviction and severity of punishment, to the relative advantages of public and private investments in dis- couraging crime,' to the most efficient form of punishment.4 Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful to the Russell J. Parsons Fund for Faculty Research at the University of Chicago Law School for its generous financial support; to Richard Craswell, Randal Picker, Richard Ross, Stephen Schulhofer, and the students in my Winter 1997 Criminal Law Seminar for helpful discussions; to Albert Alschuler, Richard Epstein, Elizabeth Garrett, Lawrence Lessig, John Lott, Tracey Meares, Martha Nussbaum, Richard Pildes, Eric Posner, Richard Posner, and Cass Sunstein for instructive written comments; to participants in the workshops at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and at the University of Virginia Law School for probing questions; and to Kenworthey Bilz for phenomenal research assistance. ' The classic exposition is Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., The Athlone Press 1970) (1780). For contemporary accounts, see Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1193 (1985); Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1232 (1985). 2 See Becker, supra note 1, at 191-93; George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. Pol. Econ. 526,530-31 (1970). ' See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, Blaming the Victim: Optimal Incentives for Private Precautions Against Crime, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 434 (1995) [hereinafter 349

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